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Abstract
User authentication is an important step to protect information, and in this context, face biometrics is
potentially advantageous. Face biometrics is natural, intuitive, easy to use, and less human-invasive.
Unfortunately, recent work has revealed that face biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks using
cheap low-tech equipment. This paper introduces a novel and appealing approach to detect face
spoofing using the spatiotemporal (dynamic texture) extensions of the highly popular local binary
pattern operator. The key idea of the approach is to learn and detect the structure and the dynamics of
the facial micro-textures that characterise real faces but not fake ones. We evaluated the approach with
two publicly available databases (Replay-Attack Database and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database).
The results show that our approach performs better than state-of-the-art techniques following the
provided evaluation protocols of each database.
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1 Introduction
Because of its natural and non-intrusive interaction, identity verification and recognition using facial
information are among the most active and challenging areas in computer vision research. Despite the
significant progress of face recognition technology in the recent decades, a wide range of viewpoints,
ageing of subjects and complex outdoor lighting are still research challenges. Advances in the area were
extensively reported in [1] and [2].
Unfortunately, the issue of verifying if the face presented to a camera is indeed a face from a real
person and not an attempt to deceive (spoof) the system has mostly been overlooked. It was not until
very recently that the problem of spoofing attacks against face biometric system gained attention of
the research community. This can be attested by the gradually increasing number of publicly available
databases [3-6] and the recently organized IJCB 2011 competition on countermeasures to 2-D facial
spoofing attacks [7] which was the first competition conducted for studying best practices for non-
intrusive spoofing detection.
A spoofing attack consists in the use of forged biometric traits to gain illegitimate access to secured
resources protected by a biometric authentication system. The lack of resistance to direct attacks is not
exclusive to face biometrics. The findings in [8], [9] and [10] indicate that fingerprint authentication
systems suffer from a similar weakness. The same shortcoming on iris recognition systems has been
diagnosed [11-13]. Finally, in [14] and [15], the spoofing attacks to speaker biometrics are addressed.
The literature review for spoofing in face recognition systems will be presented in Section 2.
In authentication systems based on face biometrics, spoofing attacks are usually perpetrated using pho-
tographs, videos or forged masks. While one can also use make-up or plastic surgery as means of
spoofing, photographs and videos are probably the most common sources of spoofing attacks. More-
over, due to the increasing popularity of social network websites (Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, Instagram
and others), a great deal of multimedia content - especially videos and photographs - is available on the
web that can be used to spoof a face authentication system. In order to mitigate the vulnerability of face
authentication systems, effective countermeasures against face spoofing have to be deployed.
Micro-texture analysis has been effectively used in detecting photo attacks from single face images
[3,16,17]. Recently, the micro-texture-based analysis for spoofing detection was extended in the spa-
tiotemporal domain in [18] and [19]. In both papers, the authors introduced a compact face liveness
description that combines facial appearance and dynamics using spatiotemporal (dynamic texture) ex-
tensions of the highly popular local binary pattern (LBP) approach [20]. More specifically, local binary
patterns from three orthogonal planes (LBP-TOP) were considered. This variant has shown to be very
effective in describing the horizontal and vertical motion patterns in addition to appearance [21].
Even though authors of [18] and [19] considered LBP-TOP-based dynamic texture analysis for face
spoofing detection, very dissimilar strategies were introduced for exploring the temporal dimension.
In [18], the LBP-TOP-based face liveness description was extracted from relatively short time win-
dows using the dense sampling of multiresolution approach, whereas an average of LBP-TOP features
over longer temporal windows was used in [19]. Moreover, the experimental setups had significant
differences because different face normalization techniques were applied in each work. Furthermore,
the evaluations were performed on different databases (Replay-Attack Database [3] and CASIA Face
Anti-Spoofing Database [6], respectively). In this article, we consolidate the methods proposed in [18]
and [19], isolating the different variables and studying the potential of the different LBP-TOP coun-
termeasures in different settings on both datasets. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our principled
approach is able to consistently outperform prior work on the same databases and following the same
evaluation protocols. We also provide an open-source framework that makes our research fully repro-
ducible with minimal effort.
This work provides an in-depth analysis on the use of dynamic texture for face liveness description.
We apply a unified experimental setup and evaluation methodology for assessing the effectiveness of
the different temporal processing strategies introduced in [18] and [19]. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows: in Section 2, a brief review of the relevant literature is provided. The basic theory
of local binary patterns in spatiotemporal domain is introduced in Section 3. Our dynamic texture-
based face liveness description is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the two publicly available
databases which are used for evaluating the proposed countermeasure. In Section 6, we report on the
experimental setup and results. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize this work highlighting its main
contributions.
2 Literature review
Considering the type of countermeasures for face anti-spoofing that does not require user collaboration,
Chakka et al. in [7] propose a classification scheme based on the following cues:
• Presence of vitality (liveness)
• Differences in motion patterns
• Differences in image quality assessment
Presence of vitality or liveness detection consists of search for features that only live faces can possess.
For instance, Pan et al. in [4] exploited the observation that humans blink once every 2 to 4 s and
proposed an eye blink-based countermeasure. Experiments carried out with the ZJU Eye Blink Database
(http://www.cs.zju.edu.cn/gpan/database/db_blink.html) showed an accuracy of 95.7%.
The countermeasures based on differences in motion patterns rely on the fact that real faces display a
different motion behaviour compared to a spoof attempt. Kollreider et al. [22] present a motion-based
countermeasure that estimates the correlation between different regions of the face using optical flow
field. In this approach, the input is considered a spoof if the optical flow field on the center of the face
and on the center of the ears present the same direction. The performance was evaluated using the subset
‘Head Rotation Shot’ of the XM2VTS database whose real access was the videos of this subset, and the
attacks were generated with hard copies of those data. Using this database, which was not made publicly
available, an equal error rate (EER) of 0.5% was achieved. Anjos and Marcel [23] present a motion-
based countermeasure measuring the correlation between the face and the background through simple
frame differences. Using the PRINT ATTACK database, that approach presented a good discrimination
power (half total error rate (HTER) equals to 9%).
Countermeasures based on differences in image quality assessment rely on the presence of artefacts in-
trinsically present at the attack media. Such remarkable properties can be originated from media quality
issues or differences in reflectance properties of the object exposed to the camera. Li et al. [24] hypothe-
size that fraudulent photographs have less high-frequency components than real ones. To test the hypoth-
esis, a small database was built with four identities containing both real access and printed photo attacks.
With this private database, an accuracy of 100% was achieved. Assuming that real access images con-
centrate more information in a specific frequency band, Tan et al. [5] and Zhang et al. [6] used, as coun-
termeasure, a set of difference of Gaussian filters (DoG) to select a specific frequency band to discrim-
inate attacks and non-attacks. Evaluations carried out with the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database and
NUAA Photograph Imposter Database (http://parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/data/NUAAImposterDB.html) showed
an equal error rate of 17% and an accuracy of 86%, respectively.
Because of differences in reflectance properties, real faces very likely present different texture patterns
compared with fake faces. Following that hypothesis, Määttä et al. [17] and Chingovska et al. [3]
explored the power of local binary patterns (LBP) as a countermeasure. Määttä et al. combined three
different LBP configurations (LBPu28,2, LBPu216,2 and LBPu28,1) in a normalized face image and trained a
support vector machine (SVM) classifier to discriminate real and fake faces. Evaluations carried out
with NUAA Photograph Impostor Database [5] showed a good discrimination power (2.9% in EER).
Chingovska et al. analysed the effectiveness of LBPu28,1 and set of extended LBPs [25] in still images
to discriminate real and fake faces. Evaluations carried out with three different databases, the NUAA
Photograph Impostor Database, Replay-Attack database and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [6],
showed a good discrimination power with a HTER equal to 15.16%, 19.03% and 18.17%, respectively.
3 LBP-based dynamic texture description
Määttä et al. [17] and Chingovska et al. [3] propose a LBP-based countermeasures to spoofing attacks
based on the hypothesis that real faces present different texture patterns in comparison with fake ones.
However, the proposed techniques analyse each frame in isolation, not considering the behaviour over
time. As pointed out in Section 2, motion is a cue explored in some works and in combination with
texture can generate a powerful countermeasure. For describing the face liveness for spoofing detection,
we considered a spatiotemporal representation which combines facial appearance and dynamics. We
adopted the LBP-based spatiotemporal representation because of its recent convincing performance in
modelling moving faces and facial expression recognition and also for dynamic texture recognition [20].
The LBP texture analysis operator, introduced by Ojala et al. [26,27], is defined as a gray-scale invariant
texture measure, derived from a general definition of texture in a local neighbourhood. It is a powerful
texture descriptor, and among its properties in real-world applications are its discriminative power, com-
putational simplicity and tolerance against monotonic gray-scale changes. The original LBP operator
forms labels for the image pixels by thresholding the 3 × 3 neighbourhood with the center value and
considering the result as a binary number. The histogram of these 28 = 256 different labels is then used
as an image descriptor.
The original LBP operator was defined to only deal with the spatial information. However, more re-
cently, it has been extended to a spatiotemporal representation for dynamic texture (DT) analysis. This
has yielded to the so-called volume local binary pattern operator (VLBP) [21]. The idea behind VLBP
consists of looking at dynamic texture (video sequence) as a set of volumes in the (X,Y, T ) space where
X and Y denote the spatial coordinates and T denotes the frame index (time). The neighborhood of
each pixel is thus defined in a three-dimensional space. Then, similar to basic LBP in spatial domain,
volume textons can be defined and extracted into histograms. Therefore, VLBP combines motion and
appearance into a dynamic texture description.
To make VLBP computationally treatable and easy to extend, the co-occurrences of the LBP on the
three orthogonal planes (LBP-TOP) was also introduced [21]. LBP-TOP consists of the three orthog-
onal planes - XY,XT and Y T - and the concatenation of local binary pattern co-occurrence statistics
in these three directions. The circular neighbourhoods are generalized to elliptical sampling to fit to the
space-time statistics. The LBP codes are extracted from the XY,XT and Y T planes, which are de-
noted as XY -LBP , XT -LBP and Y T -LBP , for all pixels, and statistics of the three different planes
are obtained and concatenated into a single histogram. The procedure is shown in Figure 1. In this
representation, DT is encoded by the XY -LBP , XT -LBP and Y T -LBP .
Figure 1 LBP from three orthogonal planes. (a) Three planes intersecting one pixel. (b) LBP
histogram of each plane. (c) Concatenating the histograms (courtesy of [21]).
Using equal radii for the time and spatial axes is not a good choice for dynamic textures [21], and
therefore, in the XT and Y T planes, different radii can be assigned to sample neighbouring points in
space and time. More generally, the radii Rx, Rx and Rt, respectively, in axes X, Y and T and the
number of neighbouring points PXY , PXT and PY T , respectively, in the XY , XT and Y T planes can
also be different. Furthermore, the type of LBP operator on each plane can vary; for example, the
uniform pattern (u2) or rotation invariant uniform pattern (riu2) variants [20] can be deployed. The
corresponding feature is denoted as LBP-TOPoperatorPXY ,PXT ,PY T ,Rx,Ry,Rt .
Assuming we are given aX×Y×T dynamic texture (xc ∈ {0, · · · ,X − 1} , yc ∈ {0, · · · , Y − 1} , tc ∈
{0, · · · , T − 1}), i.e. a video sequence. A histogram of the DT can be defined as
Hi,j =
∑
x,y,t
I {fj(x, y, t) = i} , i = 0, · · · , nj − 1; j = 0, 1, 2 (1)
where nj is the number of different labels produced by the LBP operator in the jth plane (j = 0 :
XY, 1 : XT and 2 : Y T ), and fi(x, y, t) expresses the LBP code of the central pixel (x, y, t) in the jth
plane.
Similar to the original LBP, the histograms must be normalized to get a coherent description for com-
paring the DTs:
Ni,j =
Hi,j
∑nj−1
k=0 Hk,j
. (2)
In addition to the computational simplification, compared with VLBP, LBP-TOP has the advantage
to generate independent histograms for each of the intersecting planes, in space and time, which can
be treated in combination or individually. Because of the aforementioned complexity issues on the
implementation of a VLBP-based processor, the developed spatiotemporal face liveness description uses
LBP-TOP to encode both facial appearance and dynamics.
Our key idea is to learn and detect the structure and the dynamics of the facial micro-textures that
characterise real faces but not fake ones. Due to its tolerance against monotonic gray-scale changes,
LBP-based representation is adequate for measuring the facial texture quality and determining whether
degradations due to recapturing process, e.g. the used spoofing medium, are observed. Instead of just
applying static texture analysis, we exploit also several dynamic visual cues that are based on either the
motion patterns of a genuine human face or the used display medium.
Unlike photographs and display devices, real faces are indeed non-rigid objects with contractions of
facial muscles which result in temporally deformed facial features such as eye lids and lips. Therefore,
it can be assumed that the specific facial motion patterns (including eye blinking, mouth movements
and facial expression changes) should be detected when a live human being is observed in front of the
camera. The movement of the display medium may cause several distinctive motion patterns that do not
describe genuine faces. As shown in Figure 2, the use of (planar) spoofing medium might cause sudden
characteristic reflections when a photograph is warped or because of a glossy surface of the display
medium. As it can be seen, warped photo attacks may cause also distorted facial motion patterns. It
is likely that hand-held attacks introduce synchronized shaking of the face and spoofing medium which
can be observed as excessive relative motion in the view and facial region if the distance between the
display medium and the camera is relatively short. In this work, we try to exploit the aforementioned
visual cues for face spoofing detection by exploring the dynamic texture content of the facial region. We
adopted the LBP-based spoofing detection in spatiotemporal domain because LBP-TOP features have
been successfully applied in describing dynamic events, e.g. facial expressions [21].
Figure 2 Example sequence of a warped photo attack from the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing
Database [6]. This describes the characteristic reflections (flickering) of a planar spoofing medium
and the distorted motion patterns.
4 The proposed countermeasure
Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the proposed countermeasure. First, each frame of the original frame
sequence was gray-scaled and passed through a face detector using modified census transform (MCT)
features [28]. Only detected faces with more than 50 pixels of width and height were considered. The
detected faces were geometric normalized to 64 × 64 pixels. In order to reduce the face detector noise,
the same face bounding box was used for each set of frames used in the LBP-TOP calculation. As
can be seen in the Figure 4, the middle frame was chosen. Unfortunately, the face detector is not
error free, and in case of error in the middle frame face detection, the nearest detection was chosen;
otherwise, the observation was discarded. After the face detection step, the LBP operators were applied
for each plane (XY , XT and Y T ) and the histograms were computed and then concatenated. After
the feature extraction step, binary classification can be used to discriminate spoofing attacks from real
access attempts.
Figure 3 Block diagram of the proposed countermeasure.
Figure 4 Face detection strategy for Rt = 1.
Face liveness is rather difficult to be determined based on the motion between a couple of successive
frames. The used volume can be expanded along the temporal dimension by increasing Rt, as aforemen-
tioned in Section 3. This way to deal with dynamic texture is called single resolution approach, since
only one histogram per LBP-TOP plane is accumulated. However, this leads to rather sparse sampling
on the temporal planes XT and Y T ; thus, we might loose valuable details. In order to explore the
dynamic texture information more carefully, we proposed the multiresolution approach.
The multiresolution approach can be performed by concatenating the histograms in the time domain
(XT and Y T ) for different values of Rt. The notation chosen to represent these settings is using
brackets for the multiresolution data. For example, Rt = [1 − 3] means that the LBP-TOP operator
will be calculated for Rt = 1, Rt = 2 and Rt = 3 and all resultant histograms will be concatenated.
With the multiresolution approach, dense sampling on the temporal planes XT and Y T is achieved.
The proposed countermeasure was implemented using the free signal processing and machine learning
toolbox Bob [29], and the source code of the algorithm is available as an add-on package to this frame-
work (http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbptop). After installation, it is possible to reproduce all
results reported in this article.
5 Spoofing databases
In this section, we give an overview of the two largest and most challenging face spoofing databases,
Replay-Attack Database [3] and the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [6], consisting of real access
attempts and several fake face attacks of different natures under varying conditions. Instead of still
images, both datasets contain short video recordings which makes them suitable for evaluating counter-
measures that exploit also temporal information.
5.1 Replay-Attack Database
The Replay-Attack Database (http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack) [3] consists of short video (∼10s)
recordings of both real-access and attack attempts to 50 different identities using a laptop. It contains
1,200 videos (200 real-access and 1,000 attacks), and the attacks were taken in three different scenarios
with two different illumination and support conditions. The scenarios of attack include the following:
1. Print: the attacker displays hard copies of high-resolution photographs printed on A4 paper
2. Mobile: the attacker displays photos and videos taken with an iPhone 3GS using the phone screen
3. Highdef : the attacker displays high-resolution photos and videos using an iPad screen with a
resolution of 1, 024 × 768.
The illumination conditions include the following:
1. Controlled: the background of the scene is uniform and the light of a fluorescent lamp illuminates
the scene
2. Adverse: the background of the scene is non-uniform and daylight illuminates the scene
The support conditions include the following:
1. Hand-based: the attacker holds the attack media using his own hands
2. Fixed: the attacker sets the attack device in a fixed support so it does not move during the spoofing
attempt
Figure 5 shows some examples of real accesses and attacks in different scenarios. The top row shows
samples from the controlled scenario. The bottom row shows samples from the adverse scenario.
Columns from left to right show examples of real access, printed photograph, mobile phone and tablet
attacks.
Figure 5 Some frames of real access and spoofing attempts (courtesy of [3]).
The Replay-Attack Database provides a protocol for objectively evaluating a given countermeasure.
Such protocol defines three non-overlapping partitions for training, development and testing counter-
measures (see Table 1). The training set should be used to train the countermeasure, and the develop-
ment set is used to tune the countermeasure and to estimate a threshold value to be used in the test set.
The test set must be used only to report results. As a performance measurement, the protocol advises
the use of HTER (Equation 3).
HTER =
FAR(τ,D) + FRR(τ,D)
2
, (3)
where τ is a threshold, D is the dataset, FAR is the false acceptance rate and FRR is the false rejection
rate. In this protocol, the value of τ is estimated on the EER using the development set.
Table 1 Number of videos in each subset
Type Train Devel. Test Total
Real access 60 60 80 200
Print attack 30 + 30 30 + 30 40 + 40 100 + 100
Mobile attack 60 + 60 60 + 60 80 + 80 200 + 200
Highdef attack 60 + 60 60 + 60 80 + 80 200 + 200
Total 360 360 480 1200
Numbers displayed as sums indicate the amount of hand-based and fixed support attack available in each subset [3].
5.2 CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database
The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/english/FaceAntiSpoof%20Databases.asp)
[6] contains 50 real clients, and the corresponding fake faces are captured with high quality from the
original ones. The variety is achieved by introducing three imaging qualities (low, normal and high) and
three fake face attacks which include warped photo, cut photo (eyeblink) and video attacks. Examples
from the database can be seen in Figure 6. Altogether, the database consists of 600 video clips, and
the subjects are divided into subsets for training and testing (240 and 360, respectively). Results of a
baseline system are also provided along the database for fair comparison. The baseline system considers
the high-frequency information in the facial region using multiple DoG features and SVM classifier and
is inspired by the work of Tan et al. [5].
Figure 6 Example images of real accesses and the corresponding spoofing attempts (courtesy of
[6]).
Since the main purpose of the database is to investigate the possible effects of different fake face types
and imaging qualities, the test protocol consists of seven scenarios in which particular train and test
samples are to be used. The quality test considers the three imaging qualities separately, low (1), normal
(2) and high quality (3), and evaluates the overall spoofing detection performance under a variety of
attacks at the given imaging quality. Similarly, the fake face test assesses how robust the anti-spoofing
measure is to specific fake face attacks, warped photo (4), cut photo (5) and video attacks (6), regardless
of the imaging quality. In the overall test (7), all data are used to give a more general evaluation. The
results of each scenario are reported as detection error trade-off (DET) curves and EERs, which is the
point where FAR equals FRR on the DET curve.
6 Experiments
This section provides an in-depth analysis on the proposed LBP-TOP-based face liveness description
using the Replay-Attack Database [3] and the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [6]. First, we study
the effect of different classifiers and LBP-TOP parameters by following the evaluation method proposed
in [18]. The LBP-TOP representation is computed over relatively short temporal windows, and the
results are reported using the overall classification accuracy for the individual volumes. Altogether, four
experiments were carried out evaluating the effectiveness of
1. Each LBP-TOP plane individually and in combination
2. Different classifiers
3. Different LBP operators
4. The multiresolution approach
In order to study the effect of the different variables, each parameter was tuned solely (fixing other
elements) using the development set of each face spoofing database. It should be noted that unlike the
Replay-Attack Database, the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database is lacking a specific development set.
Therefore, the first 4 experiments were performed in this database using cross-validation by randomly
dividing the training data into fivefold. Hence, the results presented for CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing
Database are actually the average HTER on the test set over five iterations of the algorithm with different
folds playing the role of a development set.
Finally, we also studied the accumulation of facial appearance and dynamics information over longer
time windows and perform an evaluation at system level. The access attempt-based results presented in
Section 6.5 were obtained using the official protocol of each database.
Inspired by [3], the LBP-TOP operator chosen to start the evaluation was LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt.
6.1 Effectiveness of each LBP-TOP plane individually and in combination
In this experiment, we analysed the effectiveness of each individual plane and their combinations when
the multiresolution area is increased. Figure 7 shows the HTER evolution, on the test set, considering
individual and combined histograms of LBP-TOP planes for each database. We used, as binary classifier,
a linear projection derived from linear discriminant analysis (LDA) as in [3].
Figure 7 Evaluation of HTER (%) in each plane when multiresolution area (Rt) is increased.
With LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt and LDA classifier test set. (a) Replay-Attack Database. (b) CASIA Face
Anti-Spoofing Database.
The results indicate differences in the performance between the two databases. The temporal compo-
nents (XT and Y T ) are a decisive cue for the Replay-Attack Database, and the combination of all
three planes (XY , XT and Y T ) gives the best performance. Conversely, for the CASIA Face Anti-
Spoofing Database, the addition of temporal planes improves the performance only slightly compared to
the spatial LBP representation (considering only the XY plane). These observations can be explained
by taking a closer look at the differences in the databases and their spoofing attack scenarios. 2-D fake
face attacks can be categorized into two groups, close-up and scenic attacks, based on how the fake face
is represented with the spoofing medium.
A close-up spoof describes only the facial area which is presented to the sensor. The main weakness
with the tightly cropped fake faces is that the boundaries of the spoofing medium, e.g. a video screen
frame, photograph edges or the attacker’s hands, are usually visible during the attack and thus can be
detected in the scene [19]. However, these visual cues can be hidden by incorporating the background
scene in the face spoof and placing the resulting scenic fake face very near to the sensor as performed
on the Replay-Attack Database. In such cases, the description of facial appearance leads to rather good
performance because the proximity between the spoofing medium and the camera causes the recaptured
face image to be out-of-focus also revealing other facial texture quality issues, like degradation due to
the used spoofing medium. Furthermore, the attacks in Replay-Attack Database are performed using two
types of support conditions, fixed and hand-held. Naturally, the LBP-TOP-based face representation can
easily detect fixed photo and print attacks since there is no variation in the facial texture over time. On
the other hand, the hand-held attacks introduce synchronized shaking of the face and spoofing medium.
This can be observed as excessive relative motion in the view, again, due to the proximity between the
display medium and the sensor. Since the distinctive global motion patterns are clearly visible also on
the facial region, they can be captured even by computing the LBP-TOP description over relatively short
temporal windows, i.e. low values of Rt.
In contrast, the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database consists of close-up face spoofs. The distance
between the camera and the display medium is much farther compared to the attacks on Replay-Attack
Database. The display medium does not usually move much in the attack scenarios. Therefore, the
overall translational movement of a fake face is much closer to the motion of a genuine head. Due to
the lack of distinctive shaking of the display medium, the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database can be
considered to be more challenging from the dynamic texture point of view. Because the motion cues
are harder to explore in some attack scenarios using small values of Rt, we investigated in Section 6.5
whether the use of longer time windows helps to reveal the disparities between a genuine face and a fake
one.
6.2 Effectiveness of different classifiers
In this experiment, we analysed the effectiveness of different classifiers when the multiresolution area
is increased. Figure 8 shows the HTER evolution, on the test set, under three different classification
schemes. The first one uses χ2 distance, since the feature vectors are histograms. The same strategy
reported in [3] was carried out. A reference histogram only with real accesses was created averaging
the histograms in the training set. The last two selected classification schemes analysed were LDA and
SVM with a radial basis function kernel (RBF).
Figure 8 Evaluation of HTER (%) with LBP-TOPu2
8,8,8,1,1,Rt
using different classifiers. (a)
Replay-Attack Database. (b) CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database.
The SVM classifier with an RBF kernel provided the best performance on the Replay-Attack Database
and the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (7.97% and 20.72% in terms of HTER, respectively).
However, it is important to remark that the same LBP-TOP configuration with an LDA classifier resulted
in comparable performance (11.35% and 24.91% in terms of HTER). This is not a huge gap, and the
classification scheme is far simpler. As similar findings have been reported [3,30], the use of simple
and computationally efficient classifiers should be indeed considered when constructing real-world anti-
spoofing solutions.
6.3 Effectiveness of different LBP operators
The size of the histogram in a multiresolution analysis, in time domain, increases linearly with Rt. The
choice of an appropriate LBP representation in the planes is an important issue since it impacts the size
of the histograms. Using uniform patterns or rotation invariant extensions, in one or multiple planes,
may bring a significant reduction in computational complexity. In this experiment, the effectiveness of
different LBP operators in the three LBP-TOP planes (XY , XT and Y T ) was analysed. Figure 9 shows
the performance, in HTER terms, configuring each plane as basic LBP (with 256 bins for P = 8), LBPu2
(uniform patterns) and LBPriu2 (rotation invariant uniform patterns) when the multiresolution area (Rt)
is increased in both databases. Results must be interpreted with the support of Figure 10, which shows
the number of bins on the histograms used for classifications in each configuration.
Figure 9 Evaluation of HTER (%) with LBP-TOP8,8,8,1,1,Rt using different LBP configurations
in planes with SVM classifier. (a) Replay-Attack Database (b) CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database.
Figure 10 Evaluation of the histogram size when (Rt) is increased.
When the multiresolution area is increased, the HTER saturates for LBPriu2 and LBPu2 on both datasets.
For the basic LBP operator, a minimum can be observed in 7.60% and 20.71% on the Replay-Attack
Database and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database, respectively. On both databases, basic LBP and
LBPu2 presented similar performance. Even though the use of regular LBP leads to the best results,
the LBPu2 operator seems to provide a reasonable trade-off between computational complexity (see
Figure 10) and performance. Hence, we will still proceed with LBPu2.
6.4 Effectiveness of the multiresolution approach
In this experiment, we analysed the effectiveness of the multiresolution approach in comparison with
the single resolution approach. The single resolution approach consists of using only fixed values for
Rt, without concatenating histograms for each Rt. With this approach, the size of the histograms will be
constant for different values of Rt, which decreases the computational complexity compared to the mul-
tiresolution approach. Figure 11 shows the HTER evolution for different values of Rt in both databases
comparing both approaches.
Figure 11 Evaluation of HTER (%) using LBP-TOPu2
8,8,8,1,1,Rt
with single resolution and multires-
olution approach using SVM classifier. (a) Replay-Attack Database. (b) CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing
database.
On both datasets, the HTER of the single resolution approach increases with Rt, whereas the multires-
olution approach helps to keep the HTER low when the multiresolution area is increased. This suggests
that the increase of Rt causes more sparse sampling in the single resolution approach when valuable
motion information is lost. In contrary, the more dense sampling of the multiresolution approach is able
to provide a more detailed description of the motion patterns, thus improving the discriminative power.
6.5 Access attempt-based analysis
In the previous experiments, the importance of the temporal dimension was studied using the single
resolution and the multiresolution approaches. As seen in Section 6.1, the multiresolution approach
is able to capture well the nature of fixed photo attacks and the excessive motion of display medium,
especially on the Replay-Attack Database. However, in some attack scenarios, the motion patterns were
harder to explore using small values of Rt. Therefore, we now study how the used temporal window
size affects the performance when the facial appearance and dynamics information are accumulated over
time. The face description of the single resolution and multiresolution methods can be accumulated
over longer time periods either by averaging the features within a time window or by classifying each
subvolume and then averaging the scores within the current window. In this manner, we are able to
provide dense temporal sampling over longer temporal windows without excessively increasing the size
of the feature histogram.
To follow the method used in previous experiments, we begin evaluating the two averaging strategies
with the LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 operator and a SVM classifier with RBF kernel. In order to determine the
video-based system performance, we applied both the average of features and scores on the first valid
time window of N frames from the beginning of each video sequence. It should be noted that the
following access attempt-based analysis is based on the official protocol of each database. Thus, the
results on Replay-Attack Database are reported in terms of HTER, whereas the performance on CASIA
Face Anti-Spoofing Database is described using EER.
The access attempt-based performance of both averaging strategies on the two databases is presented
in Figure 12. The results indicate that when the amount of temporal information increases, the better
we are able to discriminate real faces from fake ones. This is the case especially on the CASIA Face
Anti-Spoofing Database in which the distinctive motion clues, such as the excessive shaking of the
display medium, cannot be exploited. However, when longer video sequences are explored, we are
more likely to observe other specific dynamic events, such as different facial motion patterns (including
eye blinking, lip movements and facial expression changes) or sudden characteristic reflections of planar
spoofing media which can be used for differentiating real faces from fake ones. It is also interesting to
notice that by averaging features, more stable and robust spoofing detection performance is achieved on
both databases. The averaging scores of individual subvolumes seem to suffer from outliers; thus, more
sophisticated temporal processing of scores might lead to more stable behaviour.
Figure 12 Access attempt-based evaluation. Different time window sizes were evaluated using mean
of features and mean of scores with LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1. (a) Replay-Attack Database (HTER %). (b)
CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (EER %).
According to the official test protocol of CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing, also the DET curves and the EERs
for the seven scenarios should be reported. Based on the previous analysis, we chose to use the average
of features within a time window of 75 frames which corresponds to 3 s of video time. As it can be seen
in Figure 13 and Table 2, the use of only facial appearance (LBP) leads to better results compared to the
baseline method (CASIA baseline). More importantly, when the temporal planes XT and Y T are also
considered for spatiotemporal face description (LBP-TOP), a significant performance enhancement is
obtained (from 16% to 10% in terms of EER), thus confirming the benefits of encoding and exploiting
not only the facial appearance but also the facial dynamics information.
Figure 13 Overall test protocol on the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database. Overall performance
of LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using the average of features compared to the DoG baseline method and LBPu28,1.
Table 2 Comparison of EER (%)
Scenario Low Normal High Warped Cut Video Overall
DoG baseline [6] 13 13 26 16 6 24 17
LBPu28,1 11 17 13 13 16 16 16
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 10 12 13 6 12 10 10
This table shows comparison between the DoG baseline method, LBPu28,1 and LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using
the average of features on the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database.
More detailed results for each scenario are presented in Figure 14 and in Table 2. The results indicate
that the proposed LBP-TOP-based face description yields best results in all configurations except under
cut-photo attacks. As described in [6], the DoG filtering baseline method is able to capture the less
variational nature of the cut eye regions well. However, the difference in the motion patterns seems to be
too small for our LBP-TOP-based approach as mainly eye blinking occurs during the cut-photo attacks
and no other motion is present. The EER development presented in Table 3 supports this conclusion
since the performance under cut-photo attacks does not improve that much if longer temporal window
is applied compared to the other scenarios.
Figure 14 The different test protocols of the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database. Performance of
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using the average of features compared to the DoG baseline method and LBPu28,1.
Table 3 Effect of different time window sizes on CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database
Frames Low Normal High Warped Cut Video
1 17 27 23 29 16 20
5 13 20 20 19 14 14
10 14 20 19 18 16 14
25 13 13 10 10 14 12
50 13 11 10 7 13 10
75 10 12 13 6 12 10
This table shows EER development of LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using the average of features.
On the other hand, the spatiotemporal face description is able to improve the major drawbacks of DoG-
based countermeasure. Unlike the baseline method, our approach performs almost equally well at all
three imaging qualities. Furthermore, the performance under warped photo and video attacks is signif-
icantly better. Especially the characteristic specular reflections (flickering) and excessive and distorted
motion of warped photo attacks can be described very well.
6.6 Summary
Tables 4 and 5 summarize all the results obtained for each database following their provided protocols.
In order to be comparable with still frame analysis presented for example in [3], the results for the
Replay-Attack Database represent the overall classification accuracy considering each frame individu-
ally. The access attempt-based results are reported only for the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database as
requested in its test protocol.
Table 4 HTER (%) of the best results on the Replay-Attack Database
Dev Test
Motion Correlation [23] 11.78 11.79
LBPu28,1 + SVM 14.84 15.16
LBP3×3 + SVM [3] 13.90 13.87
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 + SVM 8.17 8.51
LBP-TOP8,8,8,1,1,[1−2] + SVM 7.88 7.60
This table shows the HTER of the best results achieved on the Replay-Attack Database (following the database protocol)
compared with the provided baseline.
Table 5 EER (%) of the best results on the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database
Test
DoG baseline [6] 17
LBPu28,1 + SVM 16
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 with average of features + SVM 10
This table shows the EER of the best results achieved on the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (following the database
protocol) compared with the provided baseline.
Table 4 shows also the results for the LBP (http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbp) [3] and the Mo-
tion Correlation (http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.motion) [23] based countermeasures whose
source code is freely available. Table 5 contains the provided DoG-based baseline and the holistic
LBP-based face description. It can be seen that the proposed countermeasure presented the best re-
sults, overtaking the baseline results in both databases, thus confirming the benefits of encoding and
exploiting not only the facial appearance but also the facial dynamics information. Unfortunately, our
comparison is limited to these countermeasures due to the lack of publicly available implementations of
other state-of-the-art techniques presented in the literature.
During these experiments, we observed that the general performance of the proposed countermeasure
was consistently better on the Replay-Attack Database compared to the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing
Database. As mentioned in Section 6.1, the nature of the attack scenarios is different between the
two datasets. In the Replay-Attack Database, our LBP-TOP-based face description was able to capture
motion patterns of fixed photo attacks and scenic fake face attacks already when only relatively short
time windows were explored. Performances below 10% (HTER) were achieved. On the other hand, the
CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database turned out to be more challenging from the dynamic texture point
of view. Due to the lack of motion, analysis of longer temporal windows was required in order to find
out distinctive motion patterns between genuine faces and fake ones. As it can be seen in Table 5, by
extending the micro-texture-based spoofing detection into the spatiotemporal domain, an improvement
from 16% to 10% in terms of EER was obtained. The results also indicate that the proposed dynamic
texture-based face liveness description was able to improve the state of the art on both datasets.
7 Conclusion
Inspired by the recent progress in dynamic texture, the problem of face spoofing detection was recently
investigated in two independent articles using spatiotemporal local binary patterns. The key idea of the
proposed countermeasures consists of analysing the structure and the dynamics of the micro-textures in
the facial regions using LBP-TOP features that provide an efficient and compact representation for face
liveness description. However, very dissimilar strategies were introduced for exploring the temporal
dimension even though the same features were utilized. Furthermore, the experiments were carried out
using different face normalization techniques and different databases. In this article, we consolidated
the methods proposed in the previous studies, isolating the different variables and studying the potential
of the different LBP-TOP countermeasures in different settings on the two publicly available datasets.
Furthermore, we also provided an open-source framework that makes our research fully reproducible
with minimal effort.
Experiments carried out with a unified experimental setup and evaluation methodology showed that the
dynamic texture-based countermeasure was able to consistently outperform prior work on both datasets.
Best results were achieved using a nonlinear SVM classifier, but it is important to note that experi-
ments with a simpler LDA-based classification scheme resulted in comparable performance under var-
ious spoofing attack scenarios. Thus, the use of simple and computationally efficient classifiers should
be indeed considered when constructing real-world anti-spoofing solutions. In a future work, we will
study the generalization capabilities of the proposed countermeasure using multiple face anti-spoofing
databases. In other words, we plan to perform cross-database experiments by training and tuning the
LBP-TOP-based face description solely on one dataset and test on another one.
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